Biosafety and Health
Volume 04 · Issue 06 · 2022
Published: December 25, 2022
Biosaf Health
Opinion
Open Access
Internet of things (IoT) imbedded point-of-care SARS-CoV-2 testing in the pandemic and post-pandemic eraZhaoxi Wang, Simin Liu
Biosafety and HealthVol.04,No.062022
DOI: 10.1016/j.bsheal.2022.09.005
Abstract
The outbreaks of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) Omicron variant in China have revealed a high rate of asymptomatic cases, making isolation and quarantine measures exceedingly difficult. Public health surveillance and intervention measures will require rapid and accurate testing preferably on-site using point-of-care tests (POCTs) technology for SARS-CoV-2 variants. However, delayed and/or inaccurate surveillance data is a major obstacle blocking the large-scale implementation of POCTs in curbing spread of infectious pathogens and reducing mortality during an outbreak. To determine levels of community transmission and timely strategies accordingly, highly sensitive and specific POCT embedded with the internet of things (IoT) technology could enable on-site screening and real-time data collection. A new Rapid Amplification with Sensitivity And Portability point-of-care test (RASAP-POCT) system based on thermal convection PCR is the first IoT-based isothermal nucleic acid amplification POCT, which can provide test results within 20-30 min using saliva and/or nasopharyngeal swab samples without nucleic acid extraction. With the IoT-imbedded feature, the RASAP-POCT system can be integrated easily and smoothly with China’s existing mobile-phone-based contact tracing system, which has previously proved to be highly effective in maintaining the dynamic zero-COVID policy. Current regulatory guidelines and rules should be modified to accelerate the adoption of new technologies under an emergency use authorization (EUA).
Review
Open Access
The current emergence of monkeypox: The recurrence of another smallpox?Tianyu Lu, Zongzhen Wu, Shibo Jiang, Lu Lu, Huan Liu
Biosafety and HealthVol.04,No.062022
DOI: 10.1016/j.bsheal.2022.09.004
Abstract
Since its first confirmation in London on 12 May 2022, many monkeypox cases have been reported worldwide. Noticeably, the epidemiology, pathology, and clinical features of the current emergence have been compared to those of smallpox, a severe contagious disease historically epidemic worldwide for nearly 3,000 years. However, some characteristics of the present outbreak differed from those of previous monkeypox outbreaks. Herein, we ask if this emergence of monkeypox could cause another global pandemic similar to smallpox or influenza or if it is only the re-emergence of a new strain. To address these questions, we reviewed its virology, transmission, clinical characteristics, experimental diagnosis, and prevention and intervention, giving our commentary along the way.
Open Access
Biological characteristics, biosafety prevention and control strategies for the 2022 multi-country outbreak of monkeypoxChudan Liang, Jun Qian, Linna Liu
Biosafety and HealthVol.04,No.062022
DOI: 10.1016/j.bsheal.2022.11.001
Abstract
Monkeypox is a zoonotic disease caused by the monkeypox virus (MPXV), which is a potential biological warfare agent of bioterrorism and poses the greatest threat to the world’s public biosafety and health after variola virus (VARV). While the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic has not ended yet, monkeypox is spreading menacingly. The first case of monkeypox in a nonendemic country was confirmed on May 6th, 2022, while the first imported case from Asia was found on June 21st. There were more than 16 thousand reported cases as of July 23rd, the day the World Health Organization (WHO) declared the global monkeypox outbreak a public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC) at the same level as smallpox and COVID-19; while there were more than 53 thousand cases as of September 1st. Therefore, we will propose relevant biosafety prevention and control strategies after analyzing the etiology of the 2022 multi-country monkeypox outbreak from the biological feature, transmissibility, epidemic, and variability of MPXV.
Open Access
Genome editing and human rights: Implications of the UNGPsLeifan Wang, Xiaohui Liang, Weiwen Zhang
Biosafety and HealthVol.04,No.062022
DOI: 10.1016/j.bsheal.2022.10.002
Abstract
How to address the impact of genome editing on human rights is a global challenge. The World Health Organization (WHO) recently developed a governance framework for human genome editing to provide global recommendations for establishing appropriate governance mechanisms for human genome editing. This article suggests that a human rights-respecting approach should be explicitly recognized in the framework and other relevant endeavors. Such recognition has significant implications not only on clarifying the duty of States but also on the responsibility of non-State actors, particularly biotech enterprises, to orient this technology towards respect for human rights. To implement this approach, the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs) provide helpful guidance for States, biotech enterprises, and other stakeholders to raise awareness and enhance responsible practices in the field.
Open Access
Access and benefit-sharing of the pathogenic microorganisms such as SARS-CoV-2Yalin Zhai, Geng Hong, Mengnan Jiang, Qiang Wei
Biosafety and HealthVol.04,No.062022
DOI: 10.1016/j.bsheal.2022.05.003
Abstract
With the outbreak of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), it is essential to share pathogens and their data information safely, transparently, and timely. At the same time, it is also worth exploring how to share the benefits of using the provided pathogenic microorganisms fairly and equitably. There are some mechanisms for the management and sharing of pathogenic microbial resources in the world, such as the World Health Organization (WHO), the United States, the Europe, and China. This paper studies these mechanisms and puts forward "PICC" principles, including public welfare principle, interests principle, classified principle, and category principle, to strengthen cooperation, improve efficiency, and maintain biosafety.
Original Research
Open Access
Development of two multiplex real-time PCR assays for simultaneous detection and differentiation of monkeypox virus IIa, IIb, and I clades and the B.1 lineageShuting Huo, Yuda Chen, Roujian Lu, Zhongxian Zhang, Gaoqian Zhang, Li Zhao, Yao Deng, Changcheng Wu, Wenjie Tan
Biosafety and HealthVol.04,No.062022
DOI: 10.1016/j.bsheal.2022.10.005
Abstract
An ongoing multi-country outbreak of monkeypox was reported in May 2022 with several deaths, affecting 107 countries of all six World Health Organization (WHO) regions. The WHO has declared the current monkeypox outbreak to be a Public Health Emergency of International Concern. It is, thus, necessary to rapidly and accurately detect and distinguish different monkeypox virus (MPXV) clades. We designed primers and probes based on the alignment of 138 complete genomes of poxviruses. In Panel 1, we mixed one pair of primers and three probes to detect and differentiate the MPXV Western Africa (IIa, IIb clade) and Congo Basin (I clade) and other orthopoxviruses. In Panel 2, we mixed one pair of primers and two probes to detect the 2022 MPXV (B.1 lineage and its descendant lineages). In addition, we tested the specificity and sensitivity of the assay using real-time PCR. In Panel 1, the assay reproducibly identified various concentrations of two plasmids of the monkeypox virus, whereas other orthopoxviruses did not cross-react. In Panel 2, the probe annealed well to MPXV B.1 and showed the expected linearity. These two multiple real-time assays are inclusive and highly specific for identifying different clades of MPXV.
Open Access
Assessment of biosafety and biorisk management practices among medical laboratory students in two institutions in UgandaJohn Roberts Padde, Winnie Akiteng, William Edema, Saad Mahjub Atiku, Julius Tibyangye, Job Tekakwo, Cosmas Andruga, Derick Hope, Benson Musinguzi, Jean Brenda Gesa, et al.
Biosafety and HealthVol.04,No.062022
DOI: 10.1016/j.bsheal.2022.08.005
Abstract
Medical laboratory workers handle clinical specimens, which are a threat of exposure to infectious agents. Notably, medical laboratory science students report for internships with only theoretical knowledge of biosafety and biorisk management practices, predisposing them to a higher risk of laboratory hazards. In this study, we assessed the influence of entry-level students' adherence to practices and attitudes towards biosafety and biorisk management during the Internship. An online survey tool was used to explore the practices and attitudes towards laboratory biosafety and risk management. Of the 96 students, 60 (62.5%) anonymous responses were received, and of these, 60.3% were direct entrants, and 32.8% were diploma entrants. Most (91.7%) of the students attended hospital internships, with 60.2% in Biosafety Level (BSL)-2 laboratories and 70.2% rotating in all the core areas of laboratory medicine. The 8.3% who did not attend any internship were under the direct entry category. Exposure to biohazards was not significantly associated with laboratory safety level and student entry category (P> 0.05). Recommended laboratory biosafety practices were not significantly associated with the safety level of the laboratory and student entry category (P> 0.05). Poor attitudes towards certain laboratory biosafety practices were not significantly associated with the biosafety level of the training laboratory (P> 0.05), whereas training (P = 0.021) and clean-up procedures (P = 0.048) were associated with laboratory safety levels, respectively. The direct entrants had no access to BSL-3 laboratories, and this category of students had a negative attitude towards internship attendance. Therefore, there is a need to create a multi-channel full range laboratory biosafety and biorisk management teaching reforms based on practical application, real case studies, and laboratory simulation to be incorporated into the curriculum to benefit the direct entrant.
Short Report
Open Access
An imported human case with the SARS-CoV-2 Omicron subvariant BA.2.75 in Yunnan Province, ChinaMeiling Zhang, Zhixiao Chen, Jienan Zhou, Xiaonan Zhao, Yaoyao Chen, Yanhong Sun, Zhaosheng Liu, Wenpeng Gu, Chunrui Luo, Xiaoqing Fu, et al.
Biosafety and HealthVol.04,No.062022
DOI: 10.1016/j.bsheal.2022.10.003
Abstract
The Omicron variants spread rapidly worldwide after being initially detected in South Africa in November 2021. It showed increased transmissibility and immune evasion with far more amino acid mutations in the spike (S) protein than the previously circulating variants of concern (VOCs). Notably, on 15 July 2022, we monitored the first VOC / Omicron subvariant BA.2.75 in China from an imported case. Moreover, nowadays, this subvariant still is predominant in India. It has nine additional mutations in the S protein compared to BA.2, three of which (W152R, G446S, and R493Q reversion) might contribute to higher transmissibility and immune escape. This subvariant could cause wider spread and pose a threat to the global situation. Our timely reporting and continuous genomic analysis are essential to fully elucidate the characteristics of the subvariant BA.2.75 in the future.
Perspectives
Open Access
Integrating research infrastructures into infectious diseases surveillance operations: Focus on biobanksPlebeian B. Medina, Jennifer Kealy, Zisis Kozlakidis
Biosafety and HealthVol.04,No.062022
DOI: 10.1016/j.bsheal.2022.10.001
Abstract
Technological advances in the first two decades of the 21st century have profoundly impacted medical research in many ways, with large population cohorts, biological sample collections and datasets through biobanks becoming valued global resources to guide biomedical research, drug development, and medical practice. However, in order for biobanks to maximize their impact and scientific reach of their resources, they would need to act within a complex network of infrastructures and activities. Therefore, different ways have emerged in which biobanks, including those for infectious diseases, can emerge as (part of) infrastructures, integrate within existing ones, or become an independent, yet an interoperable component of the existing infrastructural landscape. However, there has been a limited understanding and study of such mechanisms to date. This perspective aims to address this knowledge gap and illustrates these three high-level ways in which such infrastructures could integrate their activities and identifies the necessary key pre-conditions for doing so, while drawing from specific examples.
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